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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court had original appellate jurisdiction of this appeal under 
the provisions of Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(3)(j). Pursuant to its authority under Utah 
Code Ann. §78-2-2(4), the Utah Supreme Court transferred this case to the Court of 
Appeals on October 15, 2007. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§78-2a-3(2)(j). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES / STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issues presented on appeal: 
1. Does the Court of Appeals have jurisdiction to consider Appellant's appeal? 
Standard of review: "Whether appellate jurisdiction exists is a question of law." 
Kuhre v. Goodfellow, 2003 UT App 85, lj 6, 69 P.3d 286 (further quotation and citation 
omitted). "[L]ack of jurisdiction can be raised at any time by either party or by the court." 
Olson v. Salt Lake City Sch. DisL, 724 P.2d 960, 964 (Utah 1986). 
2. Did the trial court err in granting summary judgment in favor of Appellees 
Jonathan Lowry and Nathan Kinsella, by determining that Appellees were entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law on Appellant's alter ego claims? 
Standard of review: "Whether a party is entitled to summary judgment presents a 
question of law, and [appellate courts] grant no deference to the trial court's legal 
conclusions and review them for correctness. Yet, '[a] trial court has broad discretion to 
admit or exclude evidence and its determination typically will only be disturbed if it 
constitutes an abuse of discretion.5" Sunridge Dev. Corp. v. RB&G Eng'g, Inc., 2008 UT 
App 29,1| 7, _ P.3d _ (quoting State v. Whittle, 1999 UT 96, H 20, 989 P.2d 52) (further 
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citations omitted). [R. 1149-1197, 1198-1200, 1201-1285,1584-1599, 1660-1683.] 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. Nature of the Case 
This appeal arises out of a lawsuit filed by Jones & Trevor Marketing, Inc. ("J&T 
Marketing" or "Appellant") on August 29, 2002. [R. 49.] The complaint named Financial 
Development Services, Inc. ("FDS"), Jeremy Warburton, and John Neubauer as 
defendants and contained six causes of action. [R. 39-49.] All of J&T Marketing's claims 
against these defendants arose out of or were related to a Sales and Marketing Agreement 
("Agreement") entered into between FDS and J&T Marketing and made effective as of 
January 31, 2002. [R. 33-37.] (A copy of the Agreement is included in the Addendum 
hereto at Tab A.) Pursuant to the Agreement, J&T Marketing supplied FDS with the 
names, addresses and phone numbers of sales leads, and FDS marketed and sold Ted 
Thomas Courses through telemarketing and other sales efforts. [R. 1702.] After 
conducting some discovery, J&T Marketing filed a motion for leave to amend its 
complaint. [R. 301-02.] The trial court granted J&T Marketing's motion in part, 
permitting J&T Marketing to file an amended complaint that for the first time named 
Jonathan L. Lowry and Nathan Kinsella (collectively "Appellees") individually as 
defendants.1 [R. 994-996.] J&T Marketing filed its Amended Complaint on June 18, 
1
 The trial court denied J&T Marketing's Motion to Amend as it pertained to two new 
causes of action alleging civil liability for violations of Utah's Pattern of Unlawful 
Activity Act and the federal Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organizations Act. [R. 995.] 
J&T Marketing subsequently filed a Modified Motion for Leave to File Amended 
Complaint seeking to add an additional cause of action alleging conspiracy, [R. 886-87], 
but the trial court denied this motion in its entirety, [R. 1015-17]. 
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2004, alleging nine cause of action, including breach of contract, theft by conversion, 
fraudulent misrepresentation, breach of duty of good faith and fair dealing, accounting, 
injunctive relief, constructive fraud, fraudulent non-disclosure, and intentional 
interference with business relations. [R. 1027-44.] 
II. Proceedings Below 
Appellees Lowry and Kinsella filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, requesting 
summary judgment on J&T Marketing's second, third, seventh, eighth, and ninth causes. 
of action as they applied to Lowry and Kinsella.2 [R. 1198-1200.] Opposing Appellees' 
motion, J&T Marketing relied heavily upon statements made by John Neubauer in a 
deposition taken in Mr. Neubauer's separate bankruptcy proceeding. [R. 1292-1322.] 
Appellees Lowry and Kinsella objected to J&T Marketing's submission of Mr. 
Neubauer's bankruptcy deposition and moved to have it stricken from the record. [R. 
1570-1571.] At the hearing held to consider Lowry and Kinsella's motions, the trial court 
granted Appellees' motion to strike the deposition3 but granted J&T Marketing additional 
J&T Marketing's First, Fourth, and Fifth causes of action were brought only against 
FDS. [R. 1034-35, 1031-32.] J&T Marketing's Sixth cause of action dealt with injunctive 
relief. [R. 1030-31.] 
3
 Lowry and Kinsella moved to strike Mr. Neubauer's bankruptcy deposition because 
they did not have notice of or attend the deposition, as required by Rule 32(a) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, and because the portions relied on by J&T Marketing lacked 
foundation, were irrelevant, or were speculative and misleading. [R. 1577-83.] The trial 
court granted this motion on September 22, 2005. [R. 1629.] It was within the discretion 
of the trial court to exclude the bankruptcy proceeding testimony while granting J&T 
Marketing additional time to take Mr. Neubauer's deposition in this case. See Whittle, 
1999 UT 96 at H 20. J&T Marketing has not appealed the trial court's decision to strike 
Mr. Neubauer's bankruptcy deposition, and it cannot now support any factual allegations 
by relying on that stricken deposition testimony. 
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time to conduct a new deposition of Mr. Neubauer. [R. 1629.] The trial court ordered that 
after participating in this new deposition, supplemental briefs could be filed by each 
party. [R. 1629, 1635-37.] 
J&T Marketing took the deposition of Mr. Neubauer on October 18, 2005, and 
supplemental briefs were filed by both parties whereupon the trial court granted 
Appellees' motion in part. [R. 1691-1703] In its Ruling Granting In Part Defendants 
Lowry and Kinsella's Motion for Summary Judgment, entered on February 1, 2006 (a 
copy of which is included in the Addendum hereto at Tab B), the trial court granted 
summary judgment to Appellees Lowry and Kinsella on the second, seventh, eighth, and 
ninth causes of action of the Amended Complaint. [R. 1691-97.] With respect to J&T 
Marketing's third cause of action (J&T Marketing's claim for fraudulent 
misrepresentation) however, the trial court granted only partial summary judgment, 
explaining in regards to one written statement allegedly made by Lowry that "[d]rawing 
all reasonable inferences in favor of the Plaintiff, the Court denies Defendant Lowry's 
motion for summary judgment as to this claim." [R. 1692 (emphasis added).] This ruling 
denying summary judgment on this claim is set forth in the trial court's Order on 
Defendants Lowry's and Kinsella's Motion for Summary Judgment entered on March 21, 
2006 ("Order") (a copy of which is included in the Addendum hereto at Tab C). [R. 
2021.] In making its determinations, the trial court noted that "Neubauer's bankruptcy 
deposition has been stricken in its entirety, and is only reliable inasmuch as it is 
corroborated by the October 18, 2005 deposition." [R. 1695.] 
Following the entry of the Order on March 21, 2006, confirming the trial court's 
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February 1, 2006 ruling, J&T Marketing took no further action to pursue the remaining 
active claim upon which the trial court refused to grant summary judgment. After entry of 
this Order, which left an active unresolved claim, the trial court was never asked to 
certify and in fact never certified the March 21, 2006 Order as final for purposes of 
appeal pursuant to Rule 54(b). J&T Marketing, however, did obtain a default judgment 
against Defendants FDS and Exbex.com on September 13, 2007, resolving its claims 
against those two defendants. [R. 2215-17.] The September 13, 2007 default judgment 
did not in any way address J&T Marketing's outstanding claim against Appellee Lowry 
for fraudulent misrepresentation as alleged in the third cause of action of the Amended 
Complaint and on which the trial court had expressly refused to grant summary judgment 
in the ruling of February 1, 2006. 
III. Statement of Undisputed Facts4 
J&T Marketing's claims arise out of a contractual dispute between FDS and J&T 
4
 J&T Marketing's citations to the record in its Statement of Facts of the Brief of 
Appellant do not appear to correspond to pages in the record that actually support the 
stated facts. Indeed, some of the citations actually refer to J&T Marketing's argument 
section of its Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants Jonathan L. Lowiy and Nathan 
Kinsellays Motion for Summary Judgment. [R. 1293-1308.] J&T Marketing's 
Memorandum relies heavily upon the bankruptcy deposition of John Neubauer, which the 
trial court specifically struck from the record in its entirety. [R. 1695.] J&T Marketing's 
Statement of Facts also apparently cites to the new Declaration of John Neubauer (dated 
October 15, 2005), attached to its Supplemental Memorandum. [R. 1640-49.] However, 
these citations also do not correspond to evidence that would create disputed material 
facts regarding Lowry and Kinsella's liability. In addition to this citation problem, Lowry 
and Kinsella note that Mr. Neubauer's new deposition testimony demonstrates serious 
foundational flaws. Mr. Neubauer stated several times that he can no longer recollect 
much concerning the day-to-day business of FDS or Esbex.com. [R. 1641, 1645; 
Neubauer Dep. at 12:10-23; 23:10-14; 39:1-9; 40:11-14.] Thus, J&T Marketing's 
citations to the record fail to support the facts contained in its Statement of Facts. 
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Marketing over the performance of a contract solely between J&T Marketing and FDS. 
[R. 33-37, 1320.] FDS and J&T Marketing entered into this contractual relationship at or 
near the beginning of February 2002. [R. 33, 37, 1320.] Pursuant to the contract, J&T 
Marketing supplied FDS with the names, addresses and phone numbers of sales leads, 
and FDS marketed and sold through telemarketing and other sales efforts the "Ted 
Thomas Courses" supplied by J&T Marketing. [R. 1320.] Approximately five and a half 
months after entering into the contract, i.e., on July 19, 2002, FDS informed J&T 
Marketing that J&T Marketing was in breach of contract inasmuch as it had failed to 
supply the Ted Thomas Courses FDS was selling and gave notice of cancellation of the 
agreement. [R. 1316, 1598.] In reaction to FDS's cancellation, J&T Marketing filed suit 
against FDS and others on August 29, 2002. [R. 1316.] The initial complaint did not 
name Lowry or Kinsella as defendants. [R. 49.] However, when the trial court permitted 
J&T Marketing to amend its complaint, the Amended Complaint increased the causes of 
action alleged from six to nine, with five of the causes of action seeking to hold Lowry 
and Kinsella personally liable for their alleged activities arising out of or related to the 
contract between FDS and J&T Marketing. [R. 1315-16.] 
It is undisputed that J&T Marketing delayed or halted some shipments of its Ted 
Thomas Courses to FDS for a number of reasons including the following: J&T Marketing 
would delay shipment of the product if payment was delayed; J&T Marketing employed 
temporary shipping clerks to do product shipment, which resulted in staff turnover and 
ongoing training and supervision issues; and J&T Marketing finally ceased shipping Ted 
Thomas Courses altogether due to a contract dispute with FDS over payment issues. [R. 
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1317.] A third-entity, Esbex.com, while not providing Ted Thomas Courses per se, 
provided coaching/mentoring services for a monthly fee to purchasers of the Ted Thomas 
Courses. [R. 1319.] Payment issues included the question of whether fees were due on 
such coaching services. When J&T Marketing failed to ship product to FDS, FDS filled 
some orders by shipping products that had been returned by other clients because it "was 
trying to fulfill to make people happy and prevent a refund or cancellation." [R. 1647; 
Deposition of John Neubauer (dated October 18, 2005) ("Neubauer Dep.") 16:4-14.] In , 
addition, although J&T Marketing asserts that FDS and Esbex.com should have split 
coaching fees under the contract, the only evidence is that FDS believed that the coaching 
fees were not covered by the contract and were not to be shared with J&T Marketing. [R. 
1644; Neubauer Dep. 26:10 to 28:12.] 
Lowry and Kinsella were shareholders, officers and directors of FDS and 
Esbex.com. [R. 1318, 1916.] John Neubauer was the Chief Operating Officer and Chief 
Financial Officer of FDS, and both FDS and Esbex.com used Mr. Neubauer to perform 
their accounting. [R. 1598, 1917.] Mr. Neubauer was FDS's principal agent in dealing 
with J&T Marketing, and all communication with J&T marketing went through Mr. 
Neubauer. [R. 1318-19, 1916-17.] In his deposition taken in this case on October 18, 
2005, Mr. Neubauer testified that FDS and Esbex.com were legitimate companies, stating 
that he "wouldn't have worked there if [he] didn't feel that way." [R. 1640, Neubauer 
Dep. 42:4-11.] Mr. Neubauer also testified that while Lowry and Kinsella took money 
from the business, he does not remember exactly how the money was accounted for, but 
he did specifically recall that he accounted for such withdrawals as instructed. [R. 1641, 
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Neubauer Dep. 40:3-14.] The only evidence in the record is to the effect that FDS and 
Esbex.com followed corporate formalities. [R. 1196.] There is no evidence that Appellees 
Lowry or Kinsella co-mingled funds or acted outside of the scope of their corporate 
responsibilities at any time relevant to this matter. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
J&T Marketing specifically appeals an order entered by the trial court on March 
21, 2006, partially granting Lowry and Kinsella's motion for summary judgment. This 
order was not final, having been granted only in part, and leaves at issue a portion of one 
of J&T Marketing's causes of action against Lowry. Given the fact that there is an 
unadjudicated issue still pending before the trial court, this Court does not have 
jurisdiction over the appeal. Therefore, this Court only has the authority to dismiss the 
appeal for lack of jurisdiction. 
If, however, this Court determines that it can exercise jurisdiction over J&T 
Marketing's appeal, then it should uphold the trial court's decision to grant Lowry and 
Kinsella's motion for summary judgment. On a motion for summary judgment, "the non-
moving party has an obligation to come forward with sufficient proof to show that the 
non-moving party is entitled to proceed to trial." In re Discipline of Sonnenreich, 2004 
UT 3, K 41, 86 P.3d 712. In the matter before this Court, J&T Marketing failed to present 
evidence establishing any genuine issues of material fact existed regarding J&T 
Marketing's alter ego theory claims. The alter ego theory only arises if two factors are 
shown: (1) that there is a unity of interest or ownership between the individual and the 
corporation, and (2) that maintaining the corporate form would sanction fraud, promote 
4817-3352-9346:LO001.003 8 
injustice or create an inequitable result. See Smith v. Grand Canyon Expeditions Co., 
2003 UT 57, U 36, 84P.3d 1154. J&T Marketing failed to present evidence establishing 
genuine issues of material fact regarding either of these two prongs. In addition, J&T 
Marketing failed to present genuine issues of fact on every element of its claims for 
personal liability against Lowry and Kinsella. On the other hand, the undisputed evidence 
demonstrates that neither Lowry nor Kinsella should be held personally liable for any of 
J&T Marketing's alleged injuries arising out of its contractual agreement with FDS. 
Considering the submissions before it, the trial court correctly ruled that there were no 
material issues of fact on the issue of summary judgment and correctly granted Lowry 
and Kinsella summary judgment as a matter of law. 
Therefore, this Court should uphold the trial court's decision to grant summary 
judgment to Lowry and Kinsella or dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS DOES NOT HAVE JURISDICTION TO 
HEAR J&T MARKETING'S APPEAL 
Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides a procedure for the trial 
court to certify as final a judgment that addresses "fewer than all of the claims or parties." 
A judgment that "adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of 
fewer than all the parties" and that is not certified as final by the trial court does "not 
terminate the action as to any of the claims or parties," Utah R. Civ. Pro. 54(b), and is not 
final for purposes of appeal. "A trial court's granting of a motion for summary judgment 
which does not dispose of all claims of all parties, and which has not been certified as a 
4817-3352-9346.-LO001.003 9 
final judgment pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, is not a final 
judgment for purposes of appellate jurisdiction." Sneddon v. Graham, 821 P.2d 1185, 
1189(UtahCt.App. 1991). 
A. The Trial Court's Order on Defendants Lowry's and Kinsella Js Motion for 
Summary Judgment is not Final for Purposes of Appeal 
Appellate courts "[d]o not have jurisdiction over an appeal unless it is taken from 
a final judgment, or qualifies for an exception to the final judgment rule." Loffredo v. 
Holt, 2001 UT 97, Tj 10? 37 P.3d 1070. J&T Marketing, in its Docketing Statement, 
informed this Court that after reviewing the submissions on Appellees' Motion for 
Summary Judgment "[t]he District Court then concluded that none of Appellant's claims 
could be sustained against Lowry and Kinsella personally and granted Lowry and 
Kinsella's motion for summary judgment." Docketing Statement at 3-4 (emphasis added). 
(The Docketing Statement is included in the Addendum hereto at Tab D.) However, J&T 
Marketing correctly noted in a footnote that summary judgment was granted "as to every 
claim against Lowry and Kinsella personally, with the exception of the fraudulent 
misrepresentation claim against Lowry T Id. at 4 n.l (emphasis added). Despite its 
recognition that trial court's Order is not final, i.e., it did not finally adjudicate all claims, 
J&T Marketing nevertheless asserts that this Court has jurisdiction over the appeal. 
"[T]o be considered a final order, the trial court's decision must dispose of the 
claims of all parties." Loffredo, 2001 UT 97 at J^ 12. "An order that does not wholly 
dispose of a claim or a party is not final, and therefore not appealable." Sneddon, 821 
P.2d at 1189 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). By noting in its Docketing Statement that the 
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summary judgment order did not dispose of one of its claims, J&T Marketing admits that 
the trial court's summary judgment order did not wholly dispose of its claims against 
Lowry and Kinsella and the order was therefore not final for purpose of appeal. "Where 
the final judgment rule is not satisfied, the proper remedy for this court is dismissal." 
Loffredo9 2001JJT 91 dA^ll. 
B. J&T Marketing's Appeal does Not Qualify for an Exception to the Final 
Judgment Rule 
Were J&T Marketing to assert that its appeal qualifies for an exception to the final 
judgment rule, its argument would fail. This Court could assert jurisdiction over the trial 
court's non-final order granting Appellees' motion for summary judgment if the appeal 
qualifies for one of three special exceptions to the final judgment rule. See id. at 1|15. A 
non-final judgment may be appealed (1) "if the three requirements of rule 54(b) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure have been satisfied;" (2) if "a parties obtains [the appellate 
court's] permission under rule 5 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure;" or (3) "if an 
appeal is permitted by statute." Id. 
J&T Marketing did not comply with the procedures specified for certification 
under rule 54(b) and none of the three requirements of Rule 54(b) has been satisfied5; 
Even if Appellant had complied with Rule 54(b), the period for filing an appeal expired 
5
 "First, there must be multiple claims for relief or multiple parties to the action. Second, 
the judgment appealed from must have been entered on an order that would be appealable 
but for the fact that other claims or parties remain in the action. Third, the trial court, in 
its discretion, must make a determination that "there is no just reason for delay" of the 
appeal." Pate v. Marathon Steel Co., 692 P.2d 765, 767 (Utah 1984); see also Utah R. 
Civ. Pro. 54(b). The trial court never made, nor was it ever asked to make, the required 
findings to certify the Order as final. 
4817-3352-9346:LO001.003 11 
long before the appeal was filed since the order J&T Marketing has appealed from was 
entered on March 21, 2006, and the Notice of Appeal was not filed until October 9, 2007, 
nearly a year and a half later. Moreover, J&T Marketing's appeal fails to satisfy the 
requirements of Rule 5. Rule 5 requires a petition for permission to appeal to be field 
within twenty days "after the entry of the order of the trial court." Utah R. App. Pro. 5(a). 
J&T Marketing has filed no such petition. Finally, J&T Marketing has pointed to no 
applicable statute that would allow it to appeal the trial court's non-final Order entered on 
March 21, 2006. 
Though Lowry and Kinsella believe that the trial court correctly awarded 
summary judgment in their favor and that their arguments on the merits of the appeal, 
which follow, would result in an affirmance by this Court, they note that "acquiescence 
of the parties is insufficient to confer jurisdiction and that a lack of jurisdiction can be 
raised at any time by either party or by the court." Olson v. Salt Lake City Sch. Dist, 724 
P.2d 960, 964 (Utah 1986). As this Court is without jurisdiction to hear J&T Marketing's 
appeal, it appears that the only remaining available action to this Court is dismissal. 
II. THIS COURT SHOULD UPHOLD THE TRIAL COURT'S GRANT OF 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF LOWRY AND KINSELLA 
BECAUSE THERE WERE NO GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT 
A. Under the Applicable Standard of Review, the Trial Court Correctly 
Granted Summary Judgment on J&T Marketing's Claims 
Should this court determine that it has jurisdiction, Lowry and Kinsella assert that 
this Court should affirm the trial court's ruling on their summary judgment motion and 
deny the appeal. Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states that summary 
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judgment may be obtained "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine 
issues as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a 
matter of law." Utah R. Civ. Pro. 56(c). However, Utah courts have held that 
[o]nce the allegations in a complaint are challenged, the non-moving party 
has an obligation to come forward with sufficient proof to show that the 
non-moving party is entitled to proceed to trial. It is not enough to rest on 
allegations alone, particularly when the parties have had an opportunity for 
discovery. 
In re Discipline of Sonnenreich, 2004 UT 3, % 41, 86 P.3d 712 (emphasis added). 
J&T Marketing erroneously urges this Court to conduct a single inquiry into 
whether there are disputes of material facts and cites to the 1995 case of Draper City v. 
Estate of Bernardo, 888 P.2d 1097 (Utah 1995), for the proposition that it is not required 
to prove all the elements of its claims against Lowry and Kinsella. The Utah Supreme 
Court held in Gerbich v. Numed Inc., 1999 UT 37, H 12, 977 P.2d 1205, Jensen v. IHC 
Hosps., Inc., 944 P.2d 327, 339 (Utah 1997), and Sonnenreich, 2004 UT 3 at H 41, that 
while the moving party must show that there is no material issue of fact, "in opposing a 
motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff still has the ultimate burden of proving all the 
elements of his or her cause of action." Numed Inc., 1999 UT 37 at |^ 12 (quoting Jensen, 
944 P.2d at 339); accord Sonnenreich, 2004 UT 3 at T|41. 
Appellees acknowledge that "a trial court should not weigh disputed evidence, and 
its sole inquiry should be whether material issues of fact exist." Estate of Bernardo, 888 
P.2d at 1100. However, when contending against a motion for summary judgment, a 
plaintiff "has the obligation to come forward with sufficient proof to show that [it is] 
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entitled to proceed to trial." Numed, Inc., 1999 UT 37 at J^ 12. Evidence is sufficient when 
it raises "a genuine issue of fact." Klienert v. Kimball Elevator Co., 854 P.2d 1025, 1028 
(Utah Ct. App. 1993). When the plaintiff as the non-moving party does not submit 
evidence to support an element of its claim, the trial court should grant summary 
judgment on that claim. 
Utah court decisions on this standard are consistent with United States Supreme 
Court decisions interpreting the federal equivalent of Utah's Rule 56. 
When a party "fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence 
of an element essential to that party's case . . . there can be 'no genuine 
issue as to any material fact,' since a complete failure of proof concerning 
an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all 
other facts immaterial." Thus, the standard for summary judgment "mirrors 
the standard for a directed verdict," in that a moving party, who has 
otherwise made its case, is entitled to judgment as a matter of law where 
the "nonmoving party has failed to make a sufficient showing on an 
essential element of her case with respect to which she has the burden of 
proof." 
Burns v. Cannondale Bicycle Co., 876 P.2d 415, 419-20 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (quoting 
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 411 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 56(c) 
and Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986))). 
B. The Trial Court Correctly Granted Summary Judgment on J&T 
Marketing's Alter Ego Claims 
The trial court correctly granted summary judgment to Lowry and Kinsella on 
J&T Marketing's alter ego theory because there were no genuine issues of material fact 
making summary judgment appropriate as a matter of law. In Utah "a corporation is 
regarded as a legal entity, separate and apart from its stockholders.'"' Dockstader v. 
Walker, 510 P.2d 526, 528 (Utah 1973); accord Salt Lake City Corp. v. James 
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Constructors, Inc., 761 P.2d 42, 46 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). "In so immunizing corporate 
directors from personal liability, the law has proceeded on the theory that in so acting 
they are but the agents of the corporation and that the breach is that of the corporation, 
and hence it alone is answerable therefore [sic]." Reedeker v. Salisbury, 952 P.2d 577, 
582 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (quotations and citations omitted). Utah Courts "have stated 
that '[cjourts must balance piercing and insulating policies and [should] only reluctantly 
and cautiously pierce the corporate veil."' Schafir v. Harrigan, 879 P.2d 1384, 1389-
(Utah Ct. App. 1994) (quoting Salt Lake City Corp. v. James Constructors, Inc., 761 P.2d 
42, 46 (Utah Ct. App. 1988)). 
Two elements must exist for a court to pierce the corporate veil. "The corporate 
form may be disregarded when there is 'such unity of interest and ownership that the 
separate personalities of the corporation and the individual no longer exist . . . and the 
observance of the corporate form would sanction a fraud, promote injustice, or an 
inequitable result would follow.'" Smith v. Grand Canyon Expeditions Co., 2003 UT 57, 
If 36, 84 P.3d 1154 (quoting Norman v. Murray First Thrift & Loan Co., 596 P.2d 1028, 
1030 (Utah 1979)). J&T Marketing claims that it presented "enough disputed facts" to 
overcome Lowry and Kinsella's motion for summary judgment. Brief of Appellant at 12. 
The evidence, or rather lack thereof, before the trial court suggests otherwise. 
1. J&T Marketing Did Not Provide Evidence to Support the Unity of 
Interest Prong of the Alter Ego Theory 
J&T Marketing's claims boil down to a contract dispute between itself and FDS, 
and all of J&T Marketing's allegations regarding fraud and misrepresentation rest solely 
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on its unilateral interpretation of the contract terms. In Utah, factors have been identified 
that guide a determination of whether the unity-of-interest prong has been violated. These 
factors include the following: 
(1) undercapitalization of a one-man corporation; (2) failure to observe 
corporate formalities; (3) nonpayment of dividends; (4) siphoning of 
corporate funds by the dominant stockholder; (5) nonfunctioning of other 
officers or directors; (6) absence of corporate records; (7) the use of the 
corporation as a facade for operations of the dominant stockholder or 
stockholders; and (8) the use of the corporate entity in promoting injustice 
or fraud. 
Coltnan v. Colman, 743 P.2d 782, 786 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
As J&T Marketing noted in its brief, Utah courts have stated that u[f]ailure to 
distinguish between corporate and personal property, the use of corporate funds to pay 
personal expenses without proper accounting, and failure to maintain complete corporate 
and financial records are looked upon with extreme disfavor." Colman, 743 P.2d at 786 n. 
3. J&T Marketing has presented no evidence that Lowry or Kinsella commingled 
corporate funds with their own. Instead, J&T Marketing points to the evidence that 
Lowry and Kinsella took money from the corporation for their personal use. See Brief of 
Appellee at 14.6 J&T Marketing suggests that the mere fact that Lowry and Kinsella were 
distributed money out of the corporation, standing alone, raises questions of fact 
concerning the unity of interest prong of the alter ego theory. See id. However, J&T 
6
 J&T Marketing's citations to the record here do not align with actual pages in the record 
supporting its claims. To the extent J&T Marketing's citations refer to portions of its 
original Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants Jonathan L. Lowry and Nathan 
Kinsella's Motion for Summary Judgment that rely on the bankruptcy declaration of Mr. 
Neubauer, the citations provide no support since the trial court struck Mr. Neubauer's 
deposition in its entirety. [R. 1695.] J&T Marketing has not appealed the trial court's 
decision on that issue. 
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presented no evidence that these disbursements represented improper siphoning of the 
corporation's funds or that the corporation's funds were co-mingled with those of these 
shareholders. Mr. Neubauer testified that he, as the CFO of FDS and Esbex.com 
accounted for the money withdrawn by Lowry and Kinsella as instructed. [R. 1641, 
Neubauer Dep. 40:8-14.] It would be hard to find a successful corporation that did not 
provide funds to its shareholders. In addition, Mr. Neubauer testified that Lowry and 
Kinsella instructed him to "find a way to free up expenses and free up cash flow" to. 
provide refund checks to customers. [R. 1644; Neubauer Dep. 25:7-23.] 
Mr. Neubauer5s testimony as the CFO of FDS and Esbex.com was that he 
prepared the financial records including monthly income statements and net profit and 
loss statements, [R. 1642; Neubauer Dep. 36:18-25], and that from his perspective neither 
FDS nor Esbex.com had fraudulent purposes, [R. 1640; Neubauer Dep. 42:9-10]. Mr. 
Neubauer agreed that Lowry and Kinsella desired to make a profit but such was "true of 
every business." [R. 1668; Neubauer Dep. 11:9-25.] No testimony showed that Lowry or 
Kinsella, as owners of both FDS and Esbex.com, failed to comply with corporate 
formalities. The fact that Lowry and Kinsella took money out of the corporation does not 
show that corporate funds were treated as personal property, that proper accounting did 
not occur, or that proper financial records were not kept. Indeed, the evidence as stated 
above shows exactly the opposite. And J&T Marketing presented no evidence to dispute 
that Lowry and Kinsella took steps they believed to be commercially reasonable in 
managing and operating FDS and Esbex.com. [R. 1194-96.] 
Since J&T Marketing failed to present a dispute of material fact concerning the 
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unity of interest and ownership factor, the trial court correctly granted summary judgment 
to Lowry and Kinsella on this prong alone. 
2. The Trial Court Did Not Provide Evidence to Support the Fraud, 
Injustice, or Inequitable Result Prong of the Alter Ego Theory 
J&T Marketing argues in its brief that the trial court incorrectly failed to consider 
the second prong of the alter ego theory. Brief of Appellant at 15. Once the trial court had 
determined that J&T Marketing had not presented evidence to support its claim that the 
unity of interest prong was met [R. 1694], however, the trial court had no need to 
consider the second prong of the test. Nevertheless, Lowry and Kinsella submit that J&T 
Marketing did not present evidence probative to the establishment of a genuine issue of 
material fact as to the second prong of the alter ego theory. 
To support its argument, J&T Marketing relies on a Utah case in which the court 
found that the evidence of undercapitalization in that case showed that maintaining the 
corporate shield would be unfair and unjust. See Brief of Appellant at 15 (citing Salt Lake 
City Corp. v. James Constructors, Inc., 761 P.2d 42, 47 (Utah Ct. App. 1988)). In James 
Constructors, the court noted that among other things the evidence showed that the 
subsidiary's officers did not act independently from the parent, that the parent financed 
the subsidiary and paid some of its debts, and that funds were advanced by the corporate 
parent only "on an 'as needed' basis, without formal documentation and with no 
particular requirements for repayment." Id. There was no parent-subsidiary relationship 
in this case. There was no evidence presented that would tend to show either that Lowry 
or Kinsella personally paid debts of FDS or Esbex.com or that these entities paid their 
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personal debts. There is no evidence that financial transactions were made without formal 
documentation. Instead, there is evidence that all financial transactions were documented 
and accounted for by Mr. Neubauer. [R. 1641; Neubauer Dep. 40: 11-14.] 
J&T Marketing additionally points to a divorce case in which upholding the 
corporate form was determined to be unjust because "plaintiffs post-settlement 
agreement business transactions would convert substantial assets, which otherwise would 
be regarded as marital property, to corporate assets in which plaintiff had no interest." 
Colman v. Colman, 743 P.2d 782, 788 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). In Colman, the wife 
claimed that the husband was hiding marital assets behind corporate entities, which assets 
would otherwise be subject to a written property settlement agreement. See id. at 783-84. 
In this case, there is no evidence tending to show either that Lowry and Kinsella were 
using the entities to hide personal assets or vice versa. Rather, J&T Marketing halted its 
performance under the contract which rendered FDS and Esbex.com to be without the 
supplies to meet its obligations. [R. 1317.] Without a legal basis, J&T Marketing is 
improperly seeking restitution out of the personal finances of the corporate officers of 
FDS and Esbex.com. 
J&T Marketing asserts that FDS and Esbex.com were "clearly undercapitalized," 
relying solely on its contention that the entities had relatively short life-spans, that Lowry 
and Kinsella took money out of the companies, and that the companies are now insolvent. 
Brief of Appellant at 16. Insolvency does not make maintaining the corporate form unjust 
or inequitable. Appellant submits no evidence that would tend to support its claim that 
insolvency was actually caused by undercapitalization. Such a claim would at the very 
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least require a showing of how much capital was invested verses how much was needed. 
Appellant presents no evidence on either point. The undisputed evidence is that FDS and 
Esbex.com maintained their corporate formalities [R. 1196] and that Mr. Neubauer 
accounted for all draws made by Lowry and Kinsella, [R. 1641; Neubauer Dep. 40: 11-
14]. 
J&T Marketing have not presented evidence creating disputes of material fact on 
the second prong of the alter ego theory. Therefore, the trial court correctly granted 
summary judgment on that issue to Lowry and Kinsella, and this Court should affirm. 
C. The Trial Court Correctly Granted Summary Judgment on J&T 
Marketing's Causes of Action Against Lowry and Kinsella Since J&T 
Marketing Did Not Present Material Evidence to Support These Claims 
It is well settled in this State that if facts "would not establish a basis upon which 
plaintiff could recover, no matter how they were resolved, it would be useless to consume 
time, effort and expense in trying them, the saving of which is the very purpose of 
summary judgment procedure." Abdulkadir v. Western Pac. R.R. Co., 318 P.2d 339, 341 
(Utah 1957). Despite conducting comprehensive discovery into all aspects of the 
operations of FDS and Esbex.com, J&T Marketing failed to establish a factual basis upon 
which it could recover against Lowry and Kinsella.7 The trial court, recognizing this 
failure of evidence, properly granted summary judgment to Lowry and Kinsella, 
Allowing this matter to proceed would have been a useless, inefficient, and expensive 
endeavor. 
7
 Noting, however, that the trial court did not grant summary judgment on a portion of 
J&T Marketing's fraudulent misrepresentation claim. 
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J&T Marketing asserts that the trial court incorrectly held that no personal liability 
could attach to Lowry and Kinsella. Brief of Appellant at 16. The Utah Supreme Court 
has held that a director or officer of a corporation may only be held "individually liable 
for fraudulent acts or false representations of his own or in which he participates." Armed 
Forces Ins. Exch. v. Harrison, 2003 UT 14, J^ 19, 70 P.3d 35 (emphasis in original, 
further citations omitted). The fact that a corporate officer's "duties generally include[] 
overseeing the business activities of the corporation does not alone establish facts 
supporting a claim that she is personally liable for fraud." Id. at |^ 20 (emphasis in 
original). While an officer or director may be held individually liable for corporate torts 
in which they personally participate, see d'Elia v. Rice Dev., Inc., 2006 UT App 416, ffl] 
39, 43, 147 P.3d 515,8 J&T Marketing failed to provide evidentiary support for each 
element of its claims. Thus, J&T Marketing's claims fail as a matter of law, and the trial 
court properly granted summary judgment dismissing those claims. 
1. Theft by Conversion 
The trial court correctly granted Lowry and Kinsella summary judgment on J&T 
Marketing's second cause of action for theft by conversion. Theft by conversion requires 
the "willful interference with a chattel, done without lawful justification by which the 
person entitled thereto is deprived of its use and possession." State v. Twitchell, 832 P.2d 
8
 J&T Marketing's argument that corporate officer may be held personally liable for 
corporate torts in which they participate, which is distinct from piercing the corporate 
veil, is a new argument brought for the first time on appeal. "With limited exceptions, the 
practice of this court has been to decline consideration of issues raised for the first time 
on appeal." Centennial Inv. Co., LLC v. Nuttall, 2007 UT App 321, \ 27 n. 7, 171 P.3d 
458. 
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866, 870 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). J&T Marketing assert that Lowry and Kinsella 
individually interfered with J&T Marketing's product, leads, client lists, and money. This 
allegation arises out of J&T Marketing's interpretation of the contractual obligations of 
FDS found in the Sales and Marketing Agreement. See Tab A. 
J&T Marketing presented no evidence that Lowry or Kinsella converted J&T 
Marketing's property to their own use. To the contrary, the only evidence presented to the 
trial court was that neither Lowry nor Kinsella ever converted the property of J&T 
Marketing to their own personal use. [R. 1193-94.] FDS did not report coaching fees 
because those fees were not part of the contract with J&T Marketing. [R. 1644; Neubauer 
Dep. 26:10 through 28:12.] Mr. Neubauer testified that FDS and Esbex.com did not have 
fraudulent purposes in interpreting the contract and that he had no information 
concerning fraudulent actions with respect to Kinsella or Lowry in connection with the 
Ted Thomas account. [R. 1640; Neubauer Dep. 42:12-15.] 
Without any evidence tending to prove that Lowry or Kinsella converted the 
property of J&T Marketing, what alternative did the trial court have but to grant summary 
judgment in favor of Appellees? 
2. Fraudulent Misrepresentation 
J&T Marketing's third cause of action alleged fraudulent misrepresentation 
against Lowry, Kinsella, Mr. Neubauer and FDS. As mentioned previously, the trial court 
only granted partial summary judgment on this issue. See infra Part I. 
9
 Appellees here note that although trial court did not fully grant the motion for summary 
judgment on this issue, they do not concede that J&T Marketing's remaining fraudulent 
4817-3352-9346:LO001.003 22 
J&T Marketing's claim on this cause of action rests on alleged failures to perform 
promises found in the contract. [R. 1033-34.] These allegations cannot properly be 
characterized as fraudulent misrepresentations at all, but are rather, on their face, simply 
allegations of breach of contract. J&T Marketing rests these so-styled tort claims on the 
supposed evidence supposedly provided by Mr. Neubauer that FDS withheld income 
from coaching fees and made misrepresentations as to the volume of sales. Brief of 
Appellant at 18. Appellant had opportunity to take Mr. Neubauer's deposition in this and-
solicit information admissible in this case to support this claim. This Appellant failed to 
do. Instead, Mr. Neubauer stated in his deposition taken in this case that FDS did not 
believe that coaching fees fell under the Agreement with J&T Marketing. [R. 1644; 
Neubauer Dep. 26:10 to 28:12.] Even if the excluded testimony were to be considered, 
J&T Marketing presents no evidence10 to establish that Lowry or Kinsella individually or 
personally made any misrepresentations. 
In order to succeed on a claim for fraud in Utah, a plaintiff must prove the 
following elements, by clear and convincing evidence: 
(1) [t]hat a representation was made; (2) concerning a presently existing 
material fact; (3) which was false; (4) which the representor either (a) 
misrepresentation claim has any merit or that J&T Marketing can prevail on this issue at 
trial. 
10
 Again, J&T Marketing's citations to the record here do not seem to align with actual 
pages in the record supporting its claims. To the extent J&T Marketing's citations refer to 
portions of its original Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants Jonathan L. Lowry and 
Nathan Kinsella's Motion for Summary Judgment that rely on the bankruptcy declaration 
of Mr. Neubauer, the citations fail to hold any weigh since the trial court struck Mr. 
Neubauer's deposition in its entirety. [R. 1695.] J&T Marketing has not appealed the trial 
court's decision on that issue. 
4817-3352-9346:LO001.003 23 
knew to be false, or (b) made recklessly, knowing that he had insufficient 
knowledge upon which to base such representation; (5) for the purpose of 
inducing the other party to act upon it; (6) that the other party, acting 
reasonably and in ignorance of its falsity; (7) did in fact rely upon it; (8) 
and was thereby induced to act; (9) to his injury and damage. 
Prince v. Bear River Mutual Ins. Co., 2002 UT 68, TJ41. 56 P.3d 524. In this case, there 
are no issues of material fact with respect to several of the above-identified elements. 
Since J&T Marketing presented no material facts to support each element of its 
fraudulent misrepresentation allegation, summary judgment was appropriate. 
3. Constructive Fraud 
The trial court properly concluded that constructive fraud could not be maintained 
against Lowry or Kinsella as a matter of law. "A confidential relationship is a 
prerequisite to proving constructive fraud." Von Hake v. Thomas, 705 P.2d 766, 769 
(Utah 1985). "The doctrine of confidential relationships rests upon the principle of 
inequality between the parties, and implies a position of superiority occupied by one of 
the parties over the other." Id. The only relationship here between the parties arose out of 
the Agreement between J&T Marketing and FDS. Utah courts have held that the 
"confidential relationship" required by Utah law to establish constructive fraud does not 
include business dealings similar to the one here. See Kuhre v. Goodfellow, 2003 UT App 
85, Yll 19-2069 P.3d 286, 290-91 (no confidential relationship between a buyer and seller 
of property); State Bank ofS Utah v. Troy Hygro Sys.} Inc., 894 P.2d 1270, 1275 (Utah 
Ct.App.1995) (finding confidential relationship claim failed as a matter of law between 
bank and customer). Just as FDS was not in a position of confidence and trust superior to 
that of the J&T Marketing, neither Lowry nor Kinsella could be held liable for 
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constructive fraud. The trial court properly granted summary judgment on J&T 
Marketing's constructive fraud claim as a matter of law. 
4. Fraudulent Non-Disclosure 
The trial court properly granted summary judgment on J&T Marketing's cause of 
action for fraudulent non-disclosure against Lowry and Kinsella. A party alleging 
fraudulent non-disclosure must prove at least the following three elements: "(\) the 
nondisclosed infonnation is material, (2) the nondisclosed information is known to the 
party failing to disclose, and (3) there is a legal duty to communicate." Hermansen v. 
Tasulis, 2002 UT 52, ^ 24, 48 P.3d 235.n In this matter, J&T Marketing never presented 
evidence to support a legal basis for a duty to communicate such infonnation. [R. 1294-
95.] Without a legal duty to communicate, Lowry and Kinsella could not be held liable 
for fraudulent non-disclosure as a matter of law. 
Since evidence establishing one of the essential elements of fraudulent non-
disclosure was absent, J&T Marketing failed to establish a basis for recovering on this 
claim, and summary judgment was appropriate as a matter of law. 
5. Intentional Interference with Business Relations 
Finally, the trial court correctly granted summary judgment to Lowry and Kinsella 
on J&T Marketing's ninth cause of action for intentional interference with business 
relations. To succeed on a claim for intentional interference with economic relations, "a 
11
 There must also be proof that the fraud caused damages. Dilworth v. Lauritzen,\% Utah 
2d 386, 390, 424 P.2d 136, 138 (Utah 1967) (trial judge justified in finding for defendant 
on further ground that no competent evidence was given regarding the damages which 
might have been sustained even if there had been fraud). 
4817-3352-9346.-LO001.003 25 
plaintiff must demonstrate that c(l) . . . the defendant intentionally interfered with the 
plaintiffs existing or potential economic relations, (2) for an improper purpose or by 
improper means, (3) causing injury to the plaintiff.'" Anderson Development Co. v. 
Tobias, 2005 UT 36, \ 20, 116 P.3d 323. J&T Marketing merely alleges that Lowry and 
Kinsella intentionally interfered with J&T Marketing's business leads. A poor attempt to 
repackage the breach of contract claim and disregard the corporate form, this claim is not 
supported by evidence. [R. 1293-94.] J&T Marketing has not shown a single instance 
where Lowry or Kinsella personally and intentionally interfered with one of J&T 
Marketing's current or prospective business relationships. Without evidence to support 
the elements of this claim, J&T Marketing lacks a basis for recovering on this claim, and 
this court should affirm the trial court's decision on this matter. 
For all of the specific causes of action J&T Marketing alleged against Lowry and 
Kinsella, the evidence presented to the trial court by J&T Marketing was at best "merely 
colorable" and "not significantly probative." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., All U.S. 
242, 249 (1986). As such its submissions were insufficient to demonstrate genuine issues 
of material fact. See id. at 249-50 Thus, the trial court correctly granted summary 
judgment because J&T Marketing failed to meet its burden of presenting evidence 
establishing a reasonable inference that leads to Lowry and Kinsella's individual liability. 
Therefore, Defendants Lowry and Kinsella respectfully request that this Court uphold the 
decision of the trial court and deny J&T Marketing's Appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
Since this Court does not have jurisdiction to consider non-final orders on appeal, 
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Lowry and Kinsella respectfully request that J&T Marketing's appeal be immediately 
dismissed. Should this Court determine that it has jurisdiction, Lowry and Kinsella assert 
that the evidence presented to the trial court was insufficient to demonstrate a genuine 
issue of material fact. Accordingly, Appellees were entitled to summary judgment as a 
matter of law. 
Appellees respectfully request that this Court affirm the trial court's order 
granting summary judgment and deny J&T Marketing's appeal. 
Dated this j l^day of February, 2008, 
SMITH HARTVIGSEN, PLLC 
Earl Jay Peck 
R. Christopher Preston 
Attorneys for Jonathan L. Lowry and Nathan Kinsella 
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SALES AND MARKETING AGREEMENT 
This Sales and Marketing Agreement is made and is effective this 3 ( of January 2002, by and 
between FDS ("Seller") and Jones & Trevor Marketing, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as ("Jones"). 
RECITAL 
Seller desires to perform certain sales and telemarketing seryices as on the terms and conditions 
set forth to herein. 
PROVISIONS 
NOW, THEREFORE, the parties agree as follows: 
1. Scope of the Agreement: Seller agrees as an independent contractor, to sell these products 
designated for sale by Jones ("Jones' products") to those leads, supplied by Jones ("Jones' leads") 
as further defined by the terms and conditions hereinafter set forth. 
2, Seller's Services: 
A. Seller will market and sell Jones products to Jones leads during the term of this 
agreement. 
B. Seller will work toward developing marketing strategies (and will inform Jones) for 
distribution of Jones' products to Jones' leads; provided however, before implementing 
any marketing strategies the strategies will be approved by Jones in writing. 
C. Seller will get credit card approvals for sales of Jones' products using FDS' merchant 
account. 
D. Sales paid by check will be made payable to Jones and Trevor Marketing, Inc. 
E. Seller can make available, if needed, a dedicated 800 number so that Jones can include 
this number in its products, 
F. Seller will use marketing scripts already being used and included as E>diibit A. 
G. Seller will do its best to keep returns below 15% and generate at least $200 per lead 
after cancels. 
H. Seller will also be able to sell its own 4 week start-up coaching program for a one-time 
fee of $995 plus charge a $99 ongoing monthly coaching service fee. 
I. Seller will fax or email orders, for Jones' products, daily to Jones. 
3, Services bv Jones: 
A. Jones shall provide Seller leads, which will include the names, addresses, and phone 
numbers, to allow Seller to perform its duties hereunder. 
nri37 
RUG 22 2002 9:08flht *-'° LflSERJET 3200 p . 4 
B. Seller will submit a report of Seller's previous week's sales and the compensation and 
reimbursement due Jones as defined in Section 5. Report shall be sent by Seller each 
Friday for the sales made the two weeks prior. Report will include, hut not be limited to: 
(i) A breakdown and total, by order, showing the monies due to Jones as defined 
in Section 5, Compensation and Reimbursement. 
(ii) A breakdown of each bad check, customer return and credit card chargeback. 
These are defined as "Cancels" and the commissions previously retained by 
Seller for these sales will be deducted on each weekly wire made by the Seller, 
C. Jones shall provide Seller leads on each Friday. 
D. Seller will process all credit card sales on Seller's merchant accounts. 
4. Seller's Representations, Warranties, & Covenants: 
A. Seller represents and warrants that it is not a party to any agreement, which would be 
breached by execution, delivery, and performance of the terms of this Agreement to be 
performed by the Seller. 
B. Seller represents and warrants that it has all rights to any material used and furnished 
by it in connection with performance of its service hereunder. 
C. Seller acknowledges that as a result of its agreement hereunder, it shall be making use 
of, acquiring or adding to confidential information of a special unique nature and value 
relating to any Jones' trade secrets, systems, programs, procedures, manuals, confidential 
reports, and communications and customer lists (including Jones' customer list) 
("Confidential Information"), Seller further acknowledges that this information is a 
valuable, special, and unique asset of Jones and that such information is and shall remain 
the property of Jones. Additionally, Seller acknowledges that Jones may suffer 
substantial harm if the Confidential Information or any confidential information is 
disclosed including, without limitation, the list of Jones' leads. Therefore, Seller 
covenants and agrees to hold the Confidential Information in confidence and neither to 
use the Confidential Information for its own benefit or for the benefit of another, nor 
disclose the Confidential Information, now or in the future, except for the use and 
disclosure with the prior written consent of Jones or in the performance of Seller's duties 
for Jones' benefit during the term of and under this Agreement. Additionally, Seller 
covenants and agrees not to directly or indirectly by phone, mail, fax, email, website, or 
otherwise solicit Jones' leads except in the performance of its duties for Jones' benefit 
under and during the term of this Agreement. The covenants set forth in this paragraph 
shall survive termination of the Seller's engagement under this Agreement indefinitely. 
D. Seller covenants and agrees that it shall not, directly or indirectly, as an employee, 
shareholder, partner, independent contractor or otherwise, for any reason whatsoever, 
during the terra of this Agreement and for a period of three (3) years following 
termination of this Agreement, for any reason, solicit, recruit, or in any manner attempt to 
solicit or recruit a person that is an employee of Jones to leave such employment 
relationship or induce such person to leave such relationship. 
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E. Seller covenants and agrees that upon termination of this Agreement, it shall return all 
Jones' materials provide by Jones (or an entity designated by Jones) to be sold by Seller 
hereunder or to be used by the Seller to assist Seller's selling efforts hereunder including, 
but not limited to, Jones' products, videos, audio reproductions, or testimonial letters. 
F. Seller covenants and agrees that it shall perform its services diligently on behalf of 
Jones and shall refrain from engaging in any activity which directly or indirectly could be 
considered misleading, puffing, false, or deceptive, 
G. Seller covenants and agrees that it shall either itself or through its attorneys review and 
comply with the laws of the state in which it markets and sells Jones' products to Jones' 
leads and the laws of the United States of America including, without limitation, Federal 
Trade Commission Rules, Federal Trade Commission Deceptive Practices Laws, State 
Home Solicitation Acts and State Deceptive Trade Practices Act. 
5. Compensation and Reimbursement: 
A. In consideration of Seller performing its services hereunder, Jones agrees to pay and 
reimburse seller: 
(i) A commission equal to 60% of all gross sales made by Seller not including 
shipping charges by Jones. Out of that 60%, Seller will place 10% of all gross sales 
into a reserve fund for any Cancels that may occur. Any Cancels, defined as all 
returns, bad checks, and credit card chargebacks, will be paid from that reserve fund 
and reported in a weekly reconciliation report. At the end of six months, a financial 
reconciliation of that reserve will be completed and provided to Janes. 
(ii) Commissions are to be sent via bank wire each Friday for the previous week. 
6. Holdback: 
A. Seller will hold back 2.5% (two and one half percent) of the sales due to Jones each 
week until Seller has on reserve of Jones S 100,000. These funds will be used as a reserve 
against bad checks, credit card returns and chargebacks for sales that were made prior to 
the termination of this agreement. Jones' sales portion of all bad checks, credit card 
returns and chargebacks that occur after the termination of this agreement will be 
deducted from this reserve. 
B. Since the credit card chargebacks process may occur up to 6 months after the date of 
the sale and take another 6 months in the paperwork process (total of 12 months) the 
remaining reserve will be returned as follows: 
(i) $10,000 per month beginning 3 months after the termination of this 
agreement, 
7. Independent Contractor; 
A. The parties acknowledge that the relationship established by this agreement is one of 
independent contractor/contractor and not employee/employer. The parties are 
responsible for paying their own respective employees, any taxes resulting from sales 
made or commissions paid or earned pursuant to this Agreement, withholding takes, 
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unemployment taxes, state, federal and local taxes and the like. Neither party may hoLd 
itself out as a representative of the other party except as specifically set forth in this 
Agreement. 
8. Indemnification: 
A. Seller agrees to defend, hold harmless and indemnify Jones from any and all 
liabilities, expenses, actions, suits, proceedings, damages or judgments including, but not 
limited to, reasonable attorneys5 fees, arising from any act or commission of seller in the 
performance of services hereunder or selling Jones' products or as a result of a breach of 
any term, condition, representation, warranty, or covenant contained in this Agreement 
by Seller. 
B. Jones' shall defend, hold harmless indemnify Seller from any and all liabilities, 
expenses, actions, suits, claims' proceedings, damages or judgments including, but not 
limited to, reasonable attorneys* fees, arising from any act or commission of seller in the 
performance of services hereunder or selling Jones' products or as a result of a breach of 
any term, condition, representation, warranty or covenant contained in this Agreement by 
Jones. 
9. Term: 
A. The term of this Agreement shall be for twelve (12) months. This Agreement shall 
automatically renew for twelve (12) months if its termination is not canfirmed in writing 
anytime prior to the end of the current term. This Agreement may be terminated prior to 
the end of the term as follows: 
(i) Seller may terminate this Agreement upon breach by Jones of any term or 
condition to be performed by Jones in this Agreement which is not cured by 
Jones within ten (10) days of the written notice from Seller. 
(ii) Jones may terminate this Agreement at anytime upon 45 days notice to Seller. 
Upon Termination any funds held back by Seller under Paragraph 6A will be 
returned to seller in a manner consistent with 6B(I). 
10. Obligations an Termination: 
A. Upon termination of this Agreement, Seller shall immediately cease: 
(i) Any contact with Jones' leads; 
(ii) Selling Jones' products; 
(iii) In any way representing to any party that it is a seller of Jones products; and 
(iv) The use of Jones' trademarks service marks or other Confidential 
Information. 
B. Upon termination of this Agreement, Seller shall provide Jones a final accounting of 
compensation and reimbursement due Jones and forward funds within 10 business days 
by bank wire transfer. 
nn?u 
RUG 22 2002 9:09flM "^ LASERJET 3200 P-7 
C. Upon termination of this Agreement, Seller shall return to Jones all Jones' 
Confidential Information, including Jones' customer leads or lists, and all Jones' 
products, within forty eight (48) hours of termination by overnight deLivery service. 
11. Miscellaneous: 
A. This Agreement: 
(i) Shall constitute the entire agreement between the parties hereto and 
supersedes all prior agreements, written or oral, concerning the subject matter 
herein and there are no oral understandings, statements or stipulations bearing 
upon the effect of this Agreement which have not been incorporates herein. 
(ii) May be modified or amended only by a written instrument signed by each of 
the parties hereto, 
(iii) Shall bind and insure to the benefit of the parties hereto and their respective 
heirs, Successors and assigns. 
B. All notices hereunder shall be in writing and shall be deemed to hare been delivered 
on the day of mailing if sent by registered or certified mail, postage prepaid and return 
receipt requested to the addresses set forth at the beginning of this Agreement or such 
other address known by party sending notice hereunder, 
C. Any litigation involving this Agreement shall be adjudicated in a court with 
jurisdiction located in Utah County, Orem, Utah and the parties irrevocably consent to 
the personal jurisdiction and venue of such court. 
D. If any provision of this Agreement shall be held invalid or unenforceable by 
competent authority, such provision shall be constructed so as to be limited or reduced to 
be enforceable to the maximum extent compatible with the law as it shall then appear. 
The total invalidity or enforceability of any particular provision of this Agreement shall 
not affect the other provisions hereof and this Agreement shall be consumed in all 
respects as if such invalid or unenforceable provision were omitted. 
E. In the event of litigation to enforce the terms and conditions of this Agreement, the 
losing party agrees to pay the prevailing party's cost and expenses incurred including, 
without limitation, reasonable attorneys' fees. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have executed this Agreement on the fir&t date above 
written. 
Jones & Trevor Marketing, Inc. FDS 
Its: ^ L - ^ Its: f£:ft'JU.t 
Date Dats: F<L£ f & \ 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JONES & TREVOR MARKETING, INC. 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT SERVICES, 
INC., JEREMY WARBURTON, JOHN 
NEUBAUER, JONATHAN L. LOWRY, 
NATHAN KINSELLA and ESBEX, LLC, 
Defendants. 
RULING GRANTING IN PART 
DEFENDANTS LOWRY'S AND 
KINSELLA'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
Case No. 050100038 
Judge Derek P. Pullan 
This matter came before the Court on Defendants' Jonathan L. Lowry's and Nathan Kinsella's 
("Defendants") Motion for Summary Judgment, filed on May 21, 2005. Plaintiff Jones & Trevor 
Marketing ('"Plaintiff or "J &T Marketing") filed a Memorandum in Opposition on June 24, 2005. On 
July 21, 2005, Defendants' filed their Memorandum in Reply in conjunction with a motion to strike the 
bankruptcy deposition of John Neubauer. Plaintiff opposed the motion to strike on August 1, 2005. The 
Court heard oral argument on both motions on September 22, 2005. The Plaintiff was represented by 
Mr. Stephen Quesenberry, the Defendants were represented by Mr. Benjamin T. Wilson. 
At the hearing, the Court granted Defendants' motion to strike, but allowed J&T Marketing the 
opportunity to depose Mr. Neubauer again, this time in the presence of Defendants' counsel. On 
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November 22, 2005, subsequent to the taking of Mi Neubauer's deposition, Plaintiff filed a 
Supplemental Memoiandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion foi Summary Judgment On 
Decembei 12, 2005, Defendants filed a Supplemental Memorandum in Support of their motion for 
summary judgment Both parties filed notices to submit for decision, and neither request asked the 
Court to hear oral argument again on the matter 
UNDISPUTED FACTS 
After careful review of the pleadings, the Court finds the following facts are not in dispute 
1 Plaintiff J&T Marketing is a Nevada corporation that sells training courses developed by its 
owner and principal, Ted Thomas These courses offer information to those who purchase them 
about how to buy tax lien certificates and engage m other similar activities to make money 
(Amd Cpl ffill,10) 
2 Defendant FDS was a Utah corporation fiom June 22, 1998 until November 3, 2004 when it was 
dissolved (Amd Cpl U 2, Dept of Commerce Record) During its existence, FDS was engaged 
m sales and telemarketing activities (Amd Cpl 1f 11, Lowry Aff 1f 2) 
3. In late 2001 or eaily 2002, an employee of FDS, Steve Bullpit, contacted Ted Thomas (President 
of J&T Marketing) on behalf of FDS to explore the potential for a business relationship 
(Thomas Depo p 20-22) 
4 On January 31, 2002, J&T Marketing entered into a "Sales and Marketing Agreement" with FDS 
wheieby J&T Marketing supplied FDS with the names addiesses and phone numbers of sales 
leads and FDS marketed and sold Ted Thomas courses through telemarketing and other sales 
efforts (Amd Cpl f 12, 28, Sales and Marketing Agreement, Lowry Aff 1f 12) 
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The Contract provided, among other things that FDS could enroll purchasers of Ted Thomas 
courses in a program to provide coaching services for $99 per month. (Amd. Cpl. % 13; Sales 
and Marketing Agreement). 
The Agreement allowed FDS to sell its coaching program and charge monthly on-going service 
fees. (Thomas Aff. f 2H). The Agreement also required Jones to pay FDS a "commission equal 
to 60% of all gross sales made by Seller." (Id at \ 5(a)(i)). 
Defendant Esbex.com was created in September 2000 by Defendants Lowry and Kinsella as a 
product fulfillment company to fulfill product and service orders received through the sales and 
telemarketing efforts of FDS and other telemarketing companies (Kinsella I Depo. 11:19-25; 
Neubauer Depo. p. 43) 
Esbex.com was a DBA of FDS until June 2002, when it became Esbex.com , Inc., a Utah 
corporation. (Amd. Cpl. U 7; Dept. of Chamber of Commerce Record). Esbex.com provided 
coaching/mentoring services to purchasers of the Ted Thomas courses. (Amd. Cpl. 1ffl 11, ^ ) . 
Esbex.com was dissolved on November 29, 2004. (Dept. Of Commerce Record). 
Defendant John Neubauer is a former employee and the Chief Financial Officer and Chief 
Operating Officer of FDS. From the time Mr. Neubauer took over responsibility for the finances 
of FDS in February 2002 until he left a year later, FDS struggled and found it difficult to make 
payroll for its approximately 40 employees. (Neubauer Depo. p. 16-17, 40-41; Lowry Depo. 
9:19-21). 
Neubauer was FDS's principal agent in dealing with J&T Marketing. All communications with 
J&T Marketing came through Neubauer. He was FDS's point person and ran the business on a 
* 'i 701 
day-to-day basis. (Neubauer 16:19-21; Lukas Depo p. 17). Neubauer left FDS in early 2003. 
(Kinsella I Depo. 18:1-2; Lowry Depo. 29:11-13). 
10. Defendant Jeremy Warburton was a former employee of FDS and manager of FDS's 
telemarketing department. In that position, Mr. Warburton helped coordinate FDS's sales and 
marketing efforts. (Amd. Cpl. ^ 3 , 17; Lowry Aff. H 7). 
11. Defendants Lowry and Kinsella were the only two shareholders, officers, and directors of FDS 
and Esbex.com, until those companies dissolved in 2004. (Amd. Cpl. fflf 5-6; Kinsella I Depo. 
8:10-15, 11:19-25; Lowry Depo. pp. 17-18). 
12. Esbex.com provided product fulfillment services for not only FDS, but also for other companies. 
(Delia Kinsella Depo. II 9:11, 15-20). 
13. FDS experienced trouble using its Visa and MasterCard merchant accounts to clear money on 
purchases. Because the credit card purchases were expensive and transacted over the phone, they 
resulted in a large number of refunds and charge backs and, occasionally, frozen merchant 
accounts. (Neubauer Depo. 18: 10-22). 
14. FDS's problems with its merchant accounts culminated when a major merchant account 
containing credit card charges for Plaintiffs Ted Thomas courses was frozen. (Neubauer 35:11-
25, 39:22-25, 40:1-24; Lowry Aff. <h 13). 
15. Plaintiff J&T Marketing delayed or halted some shipments of its Ted Thomas courses for a 
number of reasons, including: J&T Marketing would delay shipment of the product if payment 
was delayed (Lukas Depo. 26:25-27:1. 63:10-22), J&T Marketing employed temporary shipping 
clerks to assist with product shipment, which resulted in staff turnover and ongoing training and 
supervision issues. (Lukas Depo. pp. 65-73; Neubauer Depo. p. 34) 
16. J&T Marketing also ceased shipping its Ted Thomas courses due to the dispute over payment. 
(Lowry Aff. f 13). Failure to receive the courses they had purchased with their credit cards 
resulted in dissatisfied customers, and charge backs on FDS's credit card merchant accounts. 
(Neubauer 25:10-18, pp. 33-34, 93:11-17; Lowry Depo. p. 39-40). 
17. J&T Marketing withheld delivery on orders because FDS had not timely paid J&T Marketing. 
FDS withheld payment to J&T Marketing because a percentage of its sales would not go through 
resulting in charge backs. (Lowry Depo. 49:6-23; Thomas 263: 13-17). 
18. On or about July 19, 2002, FDS communicated to J&T Marketing that FDS believed that J&T 
Marketing was in breach of the Sales and Marketing Agreement. (Lowry Aff. Tf 14). Lowry, 
FDS's President, sent J&T Marketing the letter canceling the Agreement. 
19. On or about August 29, 2002, J&T Marketing filed suit against FDS and several of its officers 
and employees (Amd. Cpl.) and on or about November 15, 2002 FDS filed a counterclaim. 
(Answer, Counterclaim and Jury Demand 11/15/2002). 
20. J&T Marketing's Amended Complaint, dated June 17, 2004, alleges the following causes of 
action: 
a. Breach of Contract against FDS for selling courses after the contract had been terminated. 
b. Theft by Conversion against Lowry, Kinsella, Neubauer and FDS by willfully interfering 
with J&T Marketing's chattel. 
c. Fraudulent Misrepresentation against Lowry, Kinsella, Neubauer and FDS related to 
FDS's performance of the contract. 
d. Breach of Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing against FDS 
e. Accounting against FDS. 
f. Injunctive Relief against Lowry, Kinselia, Warburton, FDS and Esbex.com to enjoin 
them from future sales and marketing of the Ted Thomas courses. 
g. Constructive Fraud against Lowry, Kinselia, Warburton and FDS because they "shared a 
confidential relationship based on their business activities" and "failed to disclose 
material facts to J&T Marketing." 
h. Fraudulent Non-Disclosure against Lowry, Kinselia and FDS related to Defendants' 
activities vis-a-vis Plaintiffs customers and clients, 
i. Intentional Interference with Business Relations against Lowry, Kinselia and FDS for 
interfering with Plaintiffs existing and potential economic relations with clients and sales 
leads. 
On or about November 3, 2004, FDS and Esbex.com determined that they were insolvent and 
dissolved. (Lowry Aff. ^ 18). 
FDS and Esbex.com considered the coaching services to not be included under the Sales and 
Marketing Agreement. 
FDS received refunded Ted Thomas products, and turned around and shipped them out to its 
customers. (Bankruptcy Depo 62:14-22; Oct. 18 Depo. 16:4-8). 
The owners, Lowry and Kinselia took money out of the business. (Neubauer Bankruptcy Depo. 
92:3-13). 
Lowry and Kinselia determined the allocation of monies of FDS and Esbex. (Bank. Depo. 93:13-
14,94:9-12. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Defendants move for summary judgment on J&T Marketing's second cause of action for 
conversion, third cause of action for fraudulent misrepresentation, seventh cause of action for fraud, 
eighth cause of action for fraudulent non-disclosure, and ninth cause of action for intentional 
interference with business relations. 
A party is entitled to summary judgment when there are no genuine issues of material fact and 
that party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). The court is to view all the 
facts and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the non-
moving party. Bowen v. Riverton City, 656 P.2d 434, 426 (Utah 1982). In opposing a motion for 
summary judgment, the plaintiff still has the ultimate burden of proving elements of his or her cause of 
action. "When a party fails to make a sufficient showing of an element essential to the party's 
case...there can be no genuine issue of material fact since a complete failure of proof concerning an 
essential element of the non-moving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial." Celotex 
Corp v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 321 (1986). 
The Alter Ego Doctrine and Piercing the Corporate Veil 
A corporation is a legal entity separate and apart from its shareholders. Dockstader v. Walker, 
510 P.2d 526, 528 (Utah 1973); see also, Transamerica Cash Reserve, Inc. v. Dixie Power & Water. Inc., 
789 P.2d 24, 26 (Utah 1990). The limited liability afforded to shareholders permit them to make capital 
contributions to business enterprises without placing personal assets at risk. David H. Barber, Piercing 
the Corporate Veil 17 Willamette L. Rev. 371, 371-373 (1981); accord Salt Lake City Corp. v. James 
Constructors. 761 P.2d 42, 46 n.9 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
The alter ego doctrine is an exception to this rule. Shareholders can be personally liable if there 
is "such unity of interest and ownership that the separate personalities of the corporation and the 
individual no longer exist, but the corporation is, instead, the alter ego of one or a few individuals." 
Colman v. Colman. 743 P.2d 782, 786 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). Additionally, the court must find that 
observing the corporate form under such circumstances would "sanction a fraud, promote injustice, or 
result in an inequity." Id. 
Courts will "only reluctantly and cautiously pierce the corporate veil." Schafir v. Harrigan. 879 
P.2d 1384, 1389 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (quoting Salt Lake City Corp. v. James Constr., Inc.. 761 P.2d 42, 
26 (Utah Ct. App. 1988)). "A key feature of the alter ego theory is that it is an equitable doctrine 
requiring that each case be determined upon its peculiar facts." Salt Lake City Corp.. 761 P.2d 42, 26 
(Utah Ct. App. 1988); (quoting National Bond Fin. Co. v. General Motors Corp.. 341 F.2d 1022, 1023 
(8th Cir. 1965)). The Court should examine the following factors to determine whether there is such 
unity of interest that the corporate veil should be pierced: 
(1) undercapitalization of a one-man corporation; (2) failure to observe corporate formalities; (3) 
nonpayment of dividends; (4) siphoning of corporate funds by the dominant stockholder; (5) 
nonfunctioning of other officers or directors; (6) absence of corporate records; (7) the use of the 
corporation as a facade for operations of the dominant stockholder or stockholders; and (8) the 
use of the corporate entity in promoting injustice or fraud. 
Colman v. Colman. 743 P.2d 782, 786 (Utah Ct App. 1987). Many of Plaintiff s causes of action 
against Defendants rest on the alter ego doctrine. 
Defendants argue that there is no evidence in the record that would allow Plaintiff to pierce the 
corporate veil. Defendants were at all times acting in their corporate capacities and not personally. 
Defendants also argue that many of Plaintiff s causes of action are really summed up in the breach of 
contract claim, which would not implicate the Defendants personally. Limited liability to encourage 
investment is the purpose of a corporation, and as noted, the corporate veil should be reluctantly pierced. 
Plaintiff contends that there are material issues of fact in dispute as to whether FDS and 
Esbex.com were merely the alter egos of Defendants. Plaintiff cites to the Neubauer depositions to 
demonstrate that Kinsella and Lowry failed to observe corporate formalities, siphoned corporate funds 
for personal use, and used the corporate entity to promote an injustice or fraud. Neubauer's bankruptcy 
deposition has been stricken in its entirety, and is only reliable inasmuch as it is corroborated by the 
October 18, 2005 deposition. 
Plaintiffs citation to the Neubauer depositions does not create an issue as to a material fact as to 
whether FDS and Esbex.com were the alter egos of Defendants. Plaintiff points to Neubauer's 
statements regarding the decision to continue selling coaching, and to keep the money derived from 
these sales. Neubauer testified that he understood proceeds from the coaching services to not be covered 
under the Sales and Marketing Agreement, so that these funds were not supposed to be remitted to J&T 
Marketing, whether it was before or after the cancellation of the Agreement (the timing of which is 
unclear from the deposition). Plaintiffs claim is properly characterized as breach of contract based on 
its interpretation of the contract, and does not implicate the Defendants personally. 
Plaintiff cites to Neubauer's testimony that "FDS received refunded Ted Thomas products, and 
turned around and shipped them out to its customers/' While Neubauer testified that he would consult 
with one of the Defendants before sending out these products, the statement is that FDS performed these 
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activities. There is no indication that the Defendants were acting outside the scope of their positions 
within the corporations. 
While Neubauer states that Kinsella and Lowry took money from the businesses, he does not 
state that it was done improperly. In fact, Neubauer states that he doesn't remember how the money was 
taken out by Kinsella and Lowry, whether by official paycheck or otherwise. (Neubauer Oct. Depo. 40:3-
14). He also testified that he did not have information with regards to whether the Defendants acted 
fraudulently with respect to J&T Marketing, and that he thought FDS and Esbex.com were legitimate 
companies. (Neubauer Oct Depo. 42:4-15). Significantly, Plaintiff acknowledges that it was Neubauer 
who ran the day-to-day operations of the businesses and handled communication with J&T Marketing. 
Without evidence to show that the Defendants acted in their personal capacity or took funds 
improperly, Plaintiff cannot sustain its allegation of alter ego. 
Conversion 
Theft by conversion requires the "willful interference with a chattel, done without lawful 
justification by which the person entitled thereto is deprived of its use and possession." State v. 
TwitchelL 832 P.2d 866, 870 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
The Defendants argue that there is no evidence in the record that they converted the property of 
J&T Marketing to their own use. FDS allegedly failed to remit 40% of sales to J&T Marketing, but even 
accepting this fact as true, it does not show the Defendants converted J&T Marketing property to 
Defendants' personal use. Failure to remit is a claim for breach of contract, not conversion. 
Plaintiff contends that FDS and Esbex.com were merely the alter egos of Defendants. Plaintiff 
contends that Kinsella and Lowry failed to observe corporate formalities, siphoned corporate funds for 
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personal use, and used the corporate entity to promote an injustice or fraud. The Court has already 
decided that the alter ego doctrine does not apply to the acts of Defendants, and the corporate veil should 
not be pierced. The Court grants Defendants motion for summary judgment as to the conversion claim. 
Fraudulent Misrepresentation 
In order to prove fraud, the Plaintiff must show (1) that a representation was made, (2) 
concerning a presently existing material fact, (3) which was false, (4) which the representor knew to be 
false or made recklessly, knowing that he had insufficient knowledge upon which to base such 
representation, (5) for the purpose of inducing the other party to act upon it, (6) that the other party, 
acting reasonably and in ignorance of its falsity, (7) did in fact rely upon it, (8) and was thereby induced 
to act, (9) to his injury and damage. Prince v. Bear River Mutual Ins. Co., 56 P.3d 524, 536 (Utah 2002). 
The Defendant argues that contractual promises are not statements of presently existing material 
facts, unless a party makes those promises without any intent to perform. 
The Plaintiff argues that the Defendants made fraudulent statements by inducing J&T Marketing 
to enter into the contract with FDS without any intention to fully perform. Plaintiff contends that 
Defendants misrepresented sales and refunds in weekly reconciliation reports and used Ted Thomas' 
name after the Agreement had been canceled. 
There is no evidence at the time of the contract the Defendants had a present intent not to 
perform. Whether the Sales and Marketing Agreement entitled J&T Marketing to a percentage of the 
sales from the coaching services is a question of contract interpretation. The Court has already found 
that Plaintiff cannot pierce the corporate veil. Any misrepresentations as to weekly reconciliation reports 
or regarding the volume and type of sales made, do not implicate the Defendants personally. There is 
11 x b 9 3 
also no evidence that either Defendant made statements of presently existing material facts that were 
false. 
One exception is Lowry's written statement that on termination of the contract "FDS would cease 
selling Thomas's product and cease using Thomas's name and leads." There is evidence in the record 
that FDS disregarded this representation completely. Drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the 
Plaintiff, the Court denies Defendant Lowry's motion for summary judgment as to this claim against 
Lowry. 
Constructive Fraud 
Constructive fraud requires Plaintiff to establish by clear and convincing evidence that Plaintiff 
reposed trust in the Defendants based on an existing fiduciary relationship. Von Hake v. Thomas, 705 
P.2d 766, 770 (Utah 1985). 
Defendants argue that no fiduciary relationship existed between the parties. Plaintiff contends 
that FDS had confidential customer lists and that this is the basis for finding a confidential relationship. 
As a matter of law, there was no confidential relationship between J&T Marketing and FDS 
which extended to its officers and directors. Both businesses negotiated a commercial contract at arms 
length. That contractual relationship did not grant to FDS the exclusive control over J&T Marketing's 
interests that would give rise to a confidential relationship. See, Kuhre v. Goodfellow, 69 P.3d 286, 291 
(Utah 2003). Nothing in the record demonstrates that the Defendants as officers and directors were 
responsible for failures to disclose. 
Fraudulent Non-disclosure 
A party alleging fraudulent non-disclosure must prove the following three elements, (1) the 
nondisclosed information was material, (2) the nondisclosed information is know to the party failing to 
disclose, and (3) there is a legal duty to communicate. Hermansen v. Tasulis, 48 P.3d 235, 241-242 
(Utah 2002). 
The Plaintiff cites no case law supporting its argument that the Defendants had a legal duty to 
speak. Absent a relationship that would give rise to this duty, Defendants did not have a duty to 
communicate to Plaintiff. Moreover, there is nothing in the record to demonstrate that the Defendants 
should be personally liable under this cause of action. 
Intentional Interference with Contractual Relations 
Defendant argues that this is merely a restatement of J&T Marketing's claims for breach of 
contract and fraud. There is no evidence that Defendants interfered with one of Plaintiff s current or 
prospective business relationships. 
Plaintiff argues that it was FDS that interfered with J&T Marketing's business relationships, but 
that the corporate veil should be pierced. 
Without piercing the corporate veil, this cause of action cannot implicate the Defendants 
personally. 
13 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JONES & TREVOR MARKETING, INC., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT SERVICES, 
INC., JEREMY WARBURTON, JOHN 
NEUBAUER, JONATHAN L. LOWRY, 
NATHAN KINSELLA and ESBEX.COM, 
Defendants. 
ORDER ON DEFENDANTS 
LOWRY'S AND KINSELLA'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
: JUDGMENT 
Case No. 050100038 
Division 9 - American Fork 
Judge: Derek P. Pullan 
Defendants Jonathan L. Lowry and Nathan Kinsella ("Defendants") submitted a Motion 
for Summary Judgment on May 20, 2005. Oral arguments were heard by the above-entitled 
Court on September 22, 2005, before the Honorable Derek P. Pullan, Fourth District Court 
Judge. Defendants appeared and were represented by their attorney, Benjamin T. Wilson; 
Plaintiff Jones & Trevor Marketing, Inc., appeared and was represented by its attorney, Stephen 
Quesenberry. On October 19, 2005, this Court issued its Order RE: Defendants Motion for 
Summary Judgment, permitting Plaintiff to take the deposition of John Neubauer and submit an 
amended memorandum in opposition to Defendants' summary judgment motion. The deposition 
of John Neubauer was held on October 18, 2005, and supplemental memoranda were submitted 
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UTAH COUNTY 
by both parties. This Court having heard the arguments of counsel, having reviewed all the 
memoranda of each party, being duly advised in the premises, with good cause appearing, issued 
a Ruling Granting in Part Defendants Lowry's and Kinsella's Motion for Summary Judgment 
filed on February 1, 2006 ("Ruling"), the entirety of which is hereby incorporated by reference. 
Based upon the Undisputed Facts and the Conclusions of Law contained in the Ruling, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 
1. Defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing Plaintiffs Second Cause of 
Action (Theft by Conversion) against Defendants Lowry and Kinsella is granted. 
2. Defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing Plaintiffs Third Cause of Action 
(Fraudulent Misrepresentation) against Defendant Kinsella is granted. Defendants' 
motion for summary judgment dismissing Plaintiffs Third Cause of Action (Fraudulent 
Misrepresentation) against Defendant Lowry is granted except as to Plaintiffs claim of 
fraudulent misrepresentation based on Defendant Lowry's alleged written statement that 
on termination of the contract "FDS would cease selling Thomas's product and cease 
using Thomas's name and leads." 
3. Defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing Plaintiffs Seventh Cause of 
Action (Constructive Fraud) against Defendants Lowry and Kinsella is granted. 
4. Defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing Plaintiffs Eighth Cause of Action 
(Fraudulent Non-Disclosure) against Defendants Lowry and Kinsella is granted. 
5. Defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing Plaintiffs Ninth Cause of Action 
(Intentional Interference with Business Relations) is granted. 
4849-3834-0352 LO001 001 2 
DATED this ^L ^ of March, 2006. 
s \Y RED /. 
BY THE COJURfc ; ^ > Q -
A 
arable Derek P. Pullafr 
fstrict'Court Judge 
^ 
APPROVES AS TO FORM this _ J _ day of March, 2006. 
StepheiiQuesehberry 
J. Bryan Quesenberry 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 10 day of March, 2006. I served upon the following a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing (proposed) ORDER ON DEFENDANTS LOWRY'S AND 
KINSELLA'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT by causing the same to be 
delivered by U S Mail, postage pre-paid, to the following 
Stephen Quesenberry 
J Bryan Quesenberry 
Jamestown Square 
3319 North University Avenue 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Attorneys foj Plaintiff 
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4849 3834 0352 LO001 001 4 
£ U i 9 
TabD 
01/25/08 11:15 FAX 8015783999 APPELLATE CLEPKS OFFICE ©002 
ORIGINAL 
FILED 
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
OCT 2 6 2007 
STEPHEN QUESENBERJRY (8073) 
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RiverView Plaza, Suite 300 
4844 North 300 West 
Provo, Utah 84604-5663 
Telephone (801) 375-6600 
Fax (801) 375-3865 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
JONES & TREVOR MARKETING, INC., 
Plaintiff/ Appellant, 
Vfc. 
FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT 
SERVICES, INC., JEREMY 
WARBURTON, JOHN NEUBAUER, 
JONATHAN L. LOWRY, NATHAN 
KINSELLA, and ESBEX.COM INC., 
Defendants/Appellees. 
DOCKETING STATEMENT 
Case No. 20070842 
District Court Case No. 050100038 
1. NATURE OF THE PROCEEDING 
This appeal is from a final judgment of the Fourth District Court of Utah. 
2. JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is conferred upon the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
section 78-2a-3(2)G) (2007). 
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3. DATE OF ENTRY OF JUDGMENT OR ORDER APPEALED FROM 
This appeal is from a final order and judgment of the Fourth District Court dated 
September 14, 2007. A copy of this order and judgment is attached hereto as Exhibit A. 
Plaintiff specifically appeals the order entered by the trial court on March 21, 2006 partially 
granting Defendants Jonathan L. Lowry and Nathan Kinsella's motion for summary judgment. A 
copy of this order is attached hereto as Exhibit B. 
4. DATE OF FILING OF NOTICE OF APPEAL 
The Notice of Appeal was filed on October 9, 2007. A copy of the Notice is attached 
hereto as Exhibit C 
5. DATE ANY POST-JUDGMENT MOTIONS WERE FILED & THE DATE AND 
EFFECT OF ANY ORDERS DISPOSING OF SUCH MOTIONS 
There have been no post-judgment motions filed in this case. There have been no orders 
disposing of post-judgment motions in this case. 
6. ISSUE ON APPEAL 
Did the trial court err in partially granting Appellees Jonathan Lowry and Nathan 
Kinsella's motion for summary judgment? 
Standard of review: De novo. "Because, by definition, a district court does not resolve issues of 
fact at summary judgment, we consider the record as a whole and review7 the district court's grant 
of summary judgment de novo, reciting all facts and fair inferences drawn from the record in the 
light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Poteet v. White, 2006 UT 63, f7, 147 P.3d 439. 
2 
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7. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On or about June 17, 2004, Appellant filed an Amended Complaint, alleging theft by 
conversion, fraudulent misrepresentation, constructive fraud, fraudulent nondisclosure, 
and intentional interference with business relations against, among other entities and 
individuals, Jonathan L. Lowry ("Lowry") and Nathan Kinsella ("Kinsella") personally. 
2 Lowry and Kinsella were principals of Financial Development Services, Inc. ("FDS") 
and Esbex.com, Inc. ("Esbex"). 
3. On or about May 20, 2005, Lowry and Kinsella filed a motion for summary judgment 
on the ground that they bore no personal liability and were protected by the corporate 
shield as principals of FDS and Exbex. 
4. On or about June 23, 2005, Appellant filed an opposition to the motion for summary 
judgment asserting, among other things, that issues of fact existed as to whether FDS 
and/or Esbex were the alter egos of Lowry and Kinsella. The opposition also pointed out 
other issues of fact, such as whether there was a confidential relationship between the 
parties. 
5. Eventually, the District Court found, as a matter of law, that FDS and Esbex were not 
alter egos of Jonathan L, Lowry and Nathan Kinsella and refused to pierce the corporate 
veil 
6. The District Court then concluded that none of Appellant's claims could be sustained 
3 
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against Lowry and Kinsella personally and granted Lowry and Kinsella's motion for 
summary j udgment 
7. Appellant obtained a default judgment against Financial Development Services, Inc. 
and Esbex.com, Inc. on September 14, 2007. 
8. RELATED APPEALS 
There are no related appeals. 
DATED this ffiday of October 2007. 
HILL, J<pN#DN &SCHMUTZ, L.C. 
iegfeentOuesenberryy 
Bryan Quesenfe 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant 
1
 The Court granted summary judgment to Lowry and Kinsella as to every claim against Lowry and Kinsella 
personally, with the exception of the fraudulent misrepresentation claim against Lowry. 
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Earl Jay Peck 
Steven H. Stewart 
SMITH HARTVIGSEN, PLLC 
215 South State Street, Suite 650 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Jonathan L. Lowry and 
Nathan Kinsella 
John C. Neubauer 
7954 Cypress Pine Cove 
Sandy, Utah 84070 
Esbex.com Inc. 
51 West Center Street, #403 
Orem5 Utah 84057 
Financial Development Services, Inc. 
51 West Center Street, #403 
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